Tag Archives | India

Why can’t India attract research talent?

A few Takshashila alumni and friends Kunal Singh, Varun Goel & Aravind Ilamaran have started a new opinion-analysis portal called Policy Wonks.

I write about how there’s an oversupply of PhDs and research talent in the US and elsewhere, but not enough of them have come knocking on India’s doors just yet:

American academia has been in trouble for the better part of the past decade. Till the advent of MOOCs, productivity has not changed much in higher education for about a century. As a result, university education has seen a high amount of inflation. To keep costs low, universities started supplying ever higher number of PhD students – who can be cheap research and teaching labour as RAs and TAs respectively. Thanks to this oversupply, you have hundreds of talented people applying for each tenure-track position in the sciences, for example. As Ajit Balakrishnan points out in Business Standard, this has led to the creation of a lot of “adjunct” temporary faculty positions in a space considered to be dominated by tenure.

Unfortunately, India has been poorly positioned to take advantage in this acute oversupply of talented PhDs and post doctoral researchers. This is especially surprising given that a significant number of them are Indian or of Indian origin. With the salient exception of a few people and a few Indian institutions, most researchers prefer to eke out a modest living on uncertain terms rather than come back and work in Indian academia.

We witnessed a smaller version of something similar happening when NASA started getting budget cuts in the last two decades, thereby being forced to lay off good aerospace talent – again with a lot of them being of Indian origin. India’s space agency ISRO benefited little by maintaining an insular hiring policy. Quite unfortunate for an organisation whose second director – Dr UR Rao – was wooed back to India by a visionary Vikram Sarabhai well before India had a dedicated space agency.

[Read the full piece over at Policy Wonks]

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Arranging a market for lemons

My fellow blogger Karthik Shashidhar (and his wife Priyanka Bharadwaj) started an interesting conversation on his personal blog on the grand old market in India: arranged marriage. They assert that the arranged marriage market has become increasingly illiquid, and hence unattractive.

Both Priyanka and Karthik raise an important point that can look obvious in hindsight – that as people exit the arranged marriage market in India, the market becomes smaller, more “illiquid”, and as people are unable to find suitable partners there – they continue to exit. Almost all markets have positive network effects too – the more the number of “buyers” and “sellers”, the healthier a market usually is. However, in a society divided by caste, class and religion, marriage markets were always small and illiquid, and it requires greater evidence to establish that arranged marriage markets today are necessarily less liquid than markets of previous generations.

Marriage is a curious contract that is both a labour union and a union of capital, which usually ends up creating a larger labour pool over time. ‘Arranging’ the marriages of suitable men and women has been the done thing for centuries if not millennia among large numbers of people. Finding a spouse involves heavy search costs no matter how you go about it and failed relationships constitute a significant sunk cost too. (Though apparently, people can learn from their failures. As Douglas Adams said it, “You live and you learn. At any rate, you live.”) There’s also significant information asymmetry involved – marriage is a serious affair after all, and you need to know a good amount of details any potential spouse before entering into such a contract. Further, in large families, it wasn’t just two individuals who got married, but two households.

“Arrangements” were an ideal solution to the marriage market, and it can be argued that arranged marriages provided better outcomes. Extended families and networks solved the search cost challenge, and the same networks could also solve the information asymmetry challenge – of whether the spouses were well off, were from “good families” and more.

I would argue that in the marriage market in India today, two things have happened: one, that the nature of information asymmetry has significantly changed; and two, that the arranged marriage market has become a market for lemons.

The nature of information asymmetry has changed because people look for different things in spouses – for shared interests, temperaments, greater personal compatibility and more. While financial and familial backgrounds may still matter, the asymmetry in that information is usually more readily solved. Traditional arranged marriage market mechanisms and networks fail to provide symmetry in the new kinds of information, and this makes the arranged market start failing. Also, this is happening in parallel with dating and other competing mechanisms that are making new marriage markets.

So this means that a “good” partner is unable to differentiate themselves from a “bad” partner in an arranged marriage market – and the lack of differentiation results in an overall devaluation of the “goodness” of a partner or a match. As the more high-value partners and people start moving out of the arranged marriage market to others, you are increasingly left with people who continue in the arranged marriage market because of poor choice – with them being adversely selected. Thus arranged marriage markets can become markets for lemons.

This is not to say that it’s impossible to have a happy arranged marriage these days. Nor is it inconceivable that both technology and society can evolve new ways of disrupting markets for lemons. The classic lemon market, that of second-hand cars in the US, is now a thriving one where information asymmetry is a thing of the past.

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Internet as a public good: A case for net neutrality

The internet has public good characteristics, and telecom liberalisation will not be sufficient to keep the internet healthy and growing.

Classic OPTE Project Map of the Internet 2005

Classic OPTE Project Map of the Internet 2005: Flickr

Knowledge is the currency of power today. Land, capital and unskilled labour will not matter as much as knowledge as ‘factors of production’ beyond a point in achieving growth and prosperity.

The internet is both the manifestation of the power of knowledge, and has allowed knowledge to have so much value by interlinking vast amounts of it. In the net neutrality debate, a lot of analogies have been drawn about what the internet is, on why you should either enforce neutrality or stick to market competition. People have compared the internet to highways, to cable TV, to milk cartons, to electricity grids and to many more things. Rather than improving clarity, metaphors are distracting here – as the internet is only very poorly comparable to most other things.

A basic notion about the internet is that it is a networked good, which means that its value increases with its size. As my colleagues Karthik Shashidhar and Saurabh Chandra have pointed out, the utility of a network increases as the square of the number of nodes on it. Any barriers in this network will fragment it, and reduce the overall value of the network. It can however be argued if the size of the network needs to increase, then there needs to be sufficient private gain for the network provider. Enforcing something like net neutrality, they argue, could come against that. This logic is certainly used in many other networks including that for cable TV.

The internet is all but a public good – which means that the marginal social benefit of consuming internet services is much larger than the private benefit of doing so. Human civilisation as a whole is better off when it is more interconnected, more radically networked, and capable of doing things previously unimaginable. In that context, the internet defies comparison to any other network previously built by humanity. After proto humans manage to walk upright, the quest for knowledge has been central to their progress. Since the invention of language and of writing, the internet might be the biggest radical jump in making the quest for knowledge easier.

It is true that the internet was not always open (remember AOLnet?) and that it took a series of accidents to get us where we are today. It is also true that future networks could be even more radical and we must not constrain our imagination to what is presently possible with the internet. Many argue that sufficient competition in the network provider space can ensure network health – that regulations enforcing net neutrality are both unnecessary and counter productive. My colleague Nitin Pai in fact bats for net neutrality because the ISP market is uncompetitive in India, with high entry barriers and intense regulation.

However, if  the internet is a public good – will competition ever be sufficient to ensure the vibrancy of the network? Will competition be sufficient to improve the effective network size? I would argue that it might fall short of the mark. Thus, regulations that enforce net neutrality may be necessary to prevent ‘walled gardens’ from springing up. Competition must certainly be encouraged, but restrictions must be placed both on differential pricing of data from different sources, and of content providers from directly paying for the data their consumers use. While this will lead to a few inefficiencies, it is a necessary trade-off to keep the internet as open and flat as possible.

PS. Read the takes of Pranay Kotasthane, Gautam John, Anupam Manur, Varun Ramachandra and Devika Kher on the net neutrality debate.

PPS. Also read Deepak Shenoy on how telcos aren’t really hurting and Nikhil Pahwa‘s useful definition of net neutrality.

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In The Hindu: Medicines in India, For India

I write in The Hindu on what it takes to get a drug from the lab to the market. Here is the full piece along with hyperlinked references.

January marked an important breakthrough in the fight against tropical diseases. Researchers at the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) in Delhi found a drug candidate that prevented the TB and Malaria pathogens from infecting human blood cells.

This cutting edge research took place not just in India, but for Indian challenges — whose solutions have global implications. Further, Anand Ranganathan and his colleagues did not just find this drug candidate, but also helped develop processes to develop these drug leads. It also happened thanks to a combination of a UN facility set up decades ago, attracting top global research talent to come back to India and work here. And the research was funded not just through international sources, but also a ‘Grand Challenge Programme’ on vaccines set up by the Department of Biotechnology, Government of India. Much of this success is a delayed fruit of a biotechnology push in India that started in the mid 1980s, which has gained in strength over time.

However, the discovery of the drug candidate ‘M5 synthetic peptide’ is the beginning of a long road and not the end. The process of drug discovery here is not yet complete, and has to be succeeded by more research and a host of clinical trials. Here is a plausible set of intermediate steps before a new TB or Malaria drug enters the market from the work of Ranganathan and others.

The ICGEB researchers have attempted ‘rational drug design’, where they have not only found a drug candidate, but have done so while identifying what protein target it interacts with in the body, and the mechanism it uses to prevent disease. The first steps forward for all interested researchers in the field will likely be to study further how the peptide drug candidate works, what its structure is, what the key biochemical interactions are, and how its target proteins behave.

While the drug candidate might work well in a test tube or an agar plate, its efficacy in the human body is an entirely different story. At this stage, whether the peptide can be easily absorbed by the body or be happy in blood, whether it finds the right targets, has no side effects or toxicity, are all unknown. Researchers, including those in private pharmaceuticals, can start developing variants of the M5 peptide that might have more desirable properties and have higher efficacy, and a good number of promising drug candidates might be patented by public sector researchers or pharmaceutical companies, depending on who discovers their utility.

It is after this that pre-clinical trials start on promising compounds, from tests in mammals to finally humans. Phase I clinical trials are typically about testing safety among healthy people, moving to phase II which are small trials of efficacy among patients. The last and the most expensive — Phase III, involves large, double-blind tests to determine both safety and efficacy among large groups of people.

The entire process of drug development is one of attrition, where a hundred lead compounds might trickle down to one or two medicines. It can take a decade or more, and cost in the order of a billion dollars, or 6000+ crore rupees.

Science is often described in popular retelling in a triumphalist manner, when in reality research involves many misses by researchers, incremental progress, and the eventual success of someone who stands on the shoulders of many giants.

For this process to happen, you need to have a robust research ecosystem, adequate funding, and good pipelines that ensure minimum friction in the development of drug candidates and lead compounds into medicine that you can buy at the corner shop.

The challenge in India is that tropical diseases have often been neglected by big pharmaceuticals because the size of the drug market is lower, with people having lower incomes in tropical countries. Further, companies are uncertain about intellectual property rights on essential drugs, unsure about whether they can recover high sunk costs in this inherently risky proposition. It is no surprise that big Indian corporations have stayed away from pharmaceutical R&D, finding more secure avenues for a return on their investment.

Policymakers in India will need to strike the right balance between public funding, and the role and return on private investment on drug development. Greater clarity on India’s eminent domain and compulsory licensing positions could make foreign-patented drugs more costly for India, but might spur R&D on tropical and endemic diseases in the long run.

Further, the unwritten compact in developed countries on drug development is that a thick layer of public funds pay for the basic research up to and including drug candidate discovery. It is over and above this that private pharmaceuticals come in, patent drugs and develop them.

Indian funding on basic research and drug discovery remains minuscule in comparison, with the entire Department of Biotechnology budget being lesser than 1500 crore rupees in 2014-15, or about 250 million dollars. The Government of India’s spending on drug development is broadly of the same order of magnitude of what is spent by the Gates Foundation and others on drugs for tropical diseases, and both the quality and quantity of public spending has to dramatically improve if we want more drug candidates against TB, Malaria, Dengue, Cholera and other diseases.

One way to increase the funding is to redirect extensive funds that go towards large healthcare subsidies, so that future drugs can be both better and cheaper.

India also has the opportunity to re-examine how clinical trials are governed. While we want ethical and safe practices in clinical testing, American or European regulations have accumulated some extra bureaucracy and regulations along the way. India can also set new standards on transparency so that new research is easy to discover, verify and build on.

Getting 21st century medical solutions to India’s health concerns is a long slog. The new potential cure for TB and malaria gives us a chance to think through how to develop medicines in India, and for India.

Hindu_Feb14_PavanSrinath_MedicinesFromLabtoMarketRead the article in The Hindu on their website.

 

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In Mint: Let India’s urban poor pay for good water

I write in Mint this week on how thinking along the lines of micro finance principles can change how we approach water pricing. Instead of an ideological stand on keeping water free, it’s better to ask how we can make clean water cheaper and more affordable for urban India’s most deprived.

In microfinance, people also acknowledge that it costs more to lend to the poor. When most people have to take a big loan from a bank, they have a steady income to show. They have a credit history. They also have assets they can pledge as surety, in case they default on the loan. The poorest of the poor don’t have salaries to showcase. They don’t have assets to pledge. The risk of defaulting on a loan is higher, and it is humane that they be allowed to default when the circumstances are dire. By allowing microfinance institutions to charge higher interest rates, the policies allow them to service these needs.

Similarly, the costs of supplying water for a city’s poor can be high. People often don’t have address proofs or any proofs of legal residence, making installing water connections harder. Getting even basic piping to reach the heart of a slum is not always cheap, given that there is hardly any road space to dig up. Maintaining pipes is even tougher. Installing and maintaining water meters is difficult, thereby making bill collection costlier.

It is highly disingenuous to ignore all these real issues and shout for a right to free water.The better approach is to ask, “how can we make water cheaper for the poorest?” And that line of thinking can birth an entirely new range of solutions.

Read the full article at Live Mint, February 13, 2015.

Live Mint e-Paper - Mint - 14 Feb 2015 - Page #11 Pavan Srinath

 

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India’s unusual trade pattern with the United States

Richard Rossow (via Milan Vaishnav) shared the latest US-India trade in goods data updated by the US Census Bureau.

India has a running trade deficit in goods: where it imports more goods than its exports. It is wrong to simplistically judge whether a trade deficit is good or bad – however, India does do ‘better’ when it comes to its services.

However, today this blogger learnt that the trade relationship that India has with the United States of America is quite different from that with many other big trading partners. India’s large software and services exports to the US are well-known, but India exports more goods to the US as well. Little wonder that American businesses lobby hard in Washington to be able to trade more and operate more in India.

In 2014, for the first time since 2006, India’s exports to the US are more than double its imports. It is currently unclear as to what to attribute this towards and pass judgement on whether this is a good or a bad thing. The broad trends in the two economies in the last 4 years has been one of revival and renewed growth in the United States, and faltering growth and investment in India.

India-US Trade1The timeline of imports and exports from the 1980s onwards has a few points of interest from recent years. The most prominent of these is the dip in 2009 of both Indian exports and imports, with the former affected far more than the latter. This was preceded by a sharp rise in 2007 in Indian goods imports from the US.

While Indian exports to the US bounced back since 2010, Indian goods imports plateaued in 2011 and have dropped a little in real terms since then.

The USTR website on India-US trade relations says that India’s largest goods exports to the US are precious stones (diamonds), pharmaceuticals, mineral fuel, organic chemicals and others. India’s largest goods imports are again precious stones (diamonds and gold), aircraft, machinery and optical and medical instruments.

A closer examination of export and import trends in types of goods (using the US Census Bureau’s “end use” dataset) provides the following:

1. Since 2009, the largest growth in highly traded Indian goods exports to the US as of 2013 are:
– Petroleum products, other
– Tobacco, waxes, etc
– Fish and shellfish
– Fuel oil

2. Since 2009, the largest growth in highly traded Indian goods imports from the US as of 2013 are:
– Complete military aircraft
– Gem diamonds
– Nonmonetary gold
– Newsprint
– Parts for military-type goods

3. Since 2009, the largest fall in highly traded Indian goods imports from the US as of 2013 are:
– Civilian aircraft, engines, equipment, and parts
– Chemicals-fertilizers
– Steelmaking materials
– Computers
– Drilling and oilfield equipment

I encourage readers to comment on the significance of some of these observed changes.

There’s a lot more information waiting to be unearthed from these datasets, including information on when Indian defence imports of US equipment really increased and to what extents. The defence angle is particularly interesting as the Indian ministry of defence is quite opaque in defence spending and is known to defer capital payments while making large announcements.

Readers are welcome to use the full rich XLS spreadsheet that I have compiled on all the data from the US Census Bureau relevant to the last couple of decades of India-US trade.

Addendum: The US$-Indian Rupee exchange rate has been steadily rising, making imports from the US less competitive. This could perhaps explain a part of the slump in US goods imports by India.

PS. All years used in this post are calendar years and not financial years.

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On counting and marrying out of caste

Most measurements of caste dynamics are flawed by a lack of good numbers, but that’s a good thing.

A few months ago, my fellow blogger Karthik Shashidhar had looked at how inter-caste marriages are happening in India. He had visualised the results of an interesting paper out of European Population conference hosted on the Princeton university website, which looked at how people were marrying outside their own caste. Researchers had used data from two consecutive National Family Health Surveys (NFHS), the researchers tried to identify the proportion of people who marry someone from an ‘upper’ or ‘lower’ caste, and how this varies across gender and across states.

While theirs was a valiant effort, they end up dramatically undercounting marriages outside caste, to the extent of near-complete irrelevance of the paper. This happened due the nature of the dataset. There are only four caste groupings listed in the questionnaire: General, OBC, SC and ST. Both the husband and the wife’s caste grouping is recorded, and the researchers ranked these groupings in the same order listed, and ran their comparisons.

It is obvious that this in no way comes close to what might be the true amount of cross-caste marriage taking place in India. We still have little robust evidence of whether intercaste marriage is increasing or decreasing — whether subcastes are weakening, or castes are weakening, or if they show different trends in different parts of the country. The remainder of the paper’s analysis on the correlation of intercaste marriage with education, media consumption etc can all be similarly discarded.

While we don’t know any of these (fascinating) details about caste dynamics in India with any degree of robustness, this is arguably a great thing.

What got me started on this is that the idea of marrying someone of a ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ caste is not a commutative property. Think of a couple, each from two subcastes within the same caste. An external observer might classify both subcastes of being at an ‘equal’ level. However, each spouse might feel that they are marrying ‘lower’ by marrying outside their subcaste. Thus it becomes rather subjective. Further, I was curious about how many castes and subcastes got captured in the NFHS survey, given the survey’s focus on family health. The devil is in the details, and this study captures none of it.

It’s probably for the best that we don’t know exactly how caste dynamics are changing. The Indian government’s efforts at doing a caste census (and more recently, Karnataka’s interest in the same) is deeply troubling.

Counting is often political, as Deborah Stone explains in her wonderful book, Policy Paradox. Counting can affirm and reinforce certain identities over others, and can also engender a sense of common-ness among those counted and binned together. For example, the notion that 44% of India’s children are malnourished competes with the number of children who aren’t in school, or are in poverty, or the number who live in villages. While the children overlap, each label competes for mind space, and by extension, for policy prescriptions.

Deborah Stone - Counting Political

Counting caste can only strengthen it, while migration, modernity and education just may be slowly breaking them down.

One hypothesis I offer is that sub-castes were weakening in the 1980s and 1990s in some parts of India, because migration and smaller families were leading to higher search costs for arranged marriages. But with the internet and a plethora of matrimonial sites springing up in the 2000s, the search cost of someone of the same sub-caste might have dramatically reduced, strengthening castes in turn. However, the hypothesis is not testable with extant data – the flux in caste in India today remains unknown, and should probably stay that way.

PS. Chapters from Deborah Stone’s Policy Paradox are essential readings in Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy programme. I will be teaching the CP101 Introductory Public Policy Analysis course for it in the February 2015 term.

PPS. Read Saurabh Chandra’s take from 2013 on weakening the mechanisms of caste.

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A Tale of Two Cities

The tale of Bangalore and Chennai’s growth is also the story of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu’s urbanisation.

The Indian growth story has included two actors in the past two decades, Bangalore and Chennai. Along with their parent states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, they have been the face of Indian progress, on everything from software to manufacturing to higher education.

Bangalore and Chennai are quite distinct from one another, and this post traces the differences in their urbanisation and their respective roles in their states. Chennai (formerly Madras) was designated as one of four ‘metro’ cities in India from independence, having been the capital of a British presidency before then. Bangalore was a more modest state capital. Till the mid-1980s, Bangalore was almost  two decades behind Chennai in its total population size*. Bangalore has since seen more rapid growth, and in 2011 the city was only a couple of lakh people smaller than Chennai.

BangalorevsChennai1

It is tempting to view population growth as a competition between two cities, but cities urbanise within the context of their states. While both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are among India’s more urbanised states, but it is here that Tamil Nadu leaves Karnataka far behind. Tamil Nadu is the most urbanised large state in India, with almost half its population living in cities. For context, the Indian average of urbanisation is just one third. In Karnataka, about 38 per cent of its population lives in cities and towns.

Urbanisation and the successful movement of large numbers of people out of agriculture is key to prosperity for Indians, so it pays to examine what Tamil Nadu got right.

One feature of Tamil Nadu’s success is its lack of dependence on Chennai for all its urban growth. In 1991, Chennai was about 30 per cent of urban Tamil Nadu. The state’s largest spurt of urbanisation came between 1991 and 2001, increasing by over 10 percentage points. Most of this growth came from outside Chennai, with Chennai’s share of the state’s urban population steadily declining since 1991.

BangalorevsChennai2

Much of the urban growth in Tamil Naducame from the reclassification of land and the setting up of town panchayats after the 74th amendment to the constitution was enacted. A lot of it also came from other large cities springing up. Today, Coimbatore, Madurai, Trichy and likely Tiruppur all house million+ people each.

Karnataka’s urbanisation, on the other hand, continues to be led by Bangalore. The primacy of Bangalore in the state is paramount, with Hubli-Dharwad and Mysore having a population of barely a million each. Bangalore was over 35 per cent of urban Karnataka in 2011.

Not just that, but almost half of the urban growth in Karnataka came from Bangalore’s growth between 2001 and 2011. In comparison, only about a fifth of Tamil Nadu’s urban growth came from Chennai in the same decade.

BangalorevsChennai3

This stark difference can perhaps be explained by extensive industrial growth in Tamil Nadu, which is conspicuous in its absence in its neighbouring state. From the city of Hosur giving competition to areas on the far side of the TN-Karnataka border to bustling ports trying to compete with Sri Lanka’s, Tamil Nadu has been more successful in providing an alternative to agriculture for large numbers of its people. Kerala’s urban spurt last decade appears to be similar, with habitations becoming larger and denser, as well as more people leaving agriculture as a profession. When and whether this can happen in Karnataka is an open question.

For now, Karnataka and its politics are still frequently dominated by agrarian concerns. The Western Ghats continue to pose a formidable barrier to the development of the state’s ports, with its largest port Mangalore competing with larger ports at Mumbai, Kochi and Goa. Connectivity – perhaps in the form of all-weather roads and tracks across the Western Ghats and high volume ports – may be just be the most potent driver of urbanisation in the state.

As the Karnataka government is trying to figure out how to split the Bangalore city corporation into more manageable pieces, more people should start reflecting on how to get more centres of urban growth going in the state.

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*This is the population of the entire urban agglomeration. Since the Bangalore Municipal Corporation became the Bruhat Bangalore Municipal Corporation in 2006, all urban areas around Bangalore (with the exception of small census towns and Electronic City) have been governed under one municipal authority. Chennai, on the other hand has a metropolitan corporation that is co-terminal with the Chennai district and houses a little over half of the people in the Chennai urban agglomeration. Several other city councils and town councils govern the rest of it.

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Liberalising Medical Education in India

I spoke on liberalising medical education in India, on the health panel at the Takshashila-Hudson conference on ‘Shaping India’s Growth Agenda: Implications for the World.’

We need a lot more doctors in India than we are currently producing and the stranglehold of the Medical Council of India on college education needs to be done away with.

A companion opinion piece to this video will be published soon.

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In Times of India: No Room for Jugaad on Mars

I write in the Sunday Times of India on how India must pursue high excellence like reaching Mars and get rid of the culture of jugaad.

Think of numbers about Mars. One jumps out at you. Rs 450 crore (approx $75 million). India crossed a technological milestone this week by successfully injecting a spacecraft into Martian orbit. While celebrating the fact that India has been able to achieve an elusive goal, we also want to celebrate the idea that ours is the cheapest mission to make it to Mars. A successful series of ads from Maruti Suzuki in 2010 showcases our love for the “low-cost” like no other. In one ad that was spooky in its foresight, a NASA tour guide is showing off a top-notch new spaceship meant for Jupiter. The first question that an Indian visitor asks is, “Kitna deti hai?”

ISRO did not get to Mars by using duct tape and M-seal to make the orbiter work. ISRO is not trying to repair cars by refashioning cycle chains. It takes several minutes for the ISRO command centre to beam a message to the orbiter and an equal length of time to hear back. The “thoda adjust kardenge” attitude of jugaad with people tinkering on the fly would have failed like a wet cracker here. ISRO built a top-class launch vehicle and payload, and we should not cheapen its success by harping on any number. India’s space programme is a testament to a culture of tackling hard challenges because they are hard, not because they are easy. Of doing the best, and not the cheapest. Jugaad in India was born as a necessity in impoverished conditions, and instead of elevating it to godhood we should be trying to escape a culture of jugaad as quickly as possible. ISRO is showing us the way.

[Full Article: No Room for Jugaad on Mars, September 28, 2014]

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