Tag Archives | Karnataka

A Tale of Two Cities

The tale of Bangalore and Chennai’s growth is also the story of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu’s urbanisation.

The Indian growth story has included two actors in the past two decades, Bangalore and Chennai. Along with their parent states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, they have been the face of Indian progress, on everything from software to manufacturing to higher education.

Bangalore and Chennai are quite distinct from one another, and this post traces the differences in their urbanisation and their respective roles in their states. Chennai (formerly Madras) was designated as one of four ‘metro’ cities in India from independence, having been the capital of a British presidency before then. Bangalore was a more modest state capital. Till the mid-1980s, Bangalore was almost  two decades behind Chennai in its total population size*. Bangalore has since seen more rapid growth, and in 2011 the city was only a couple of lakh people smaller than Chennai.

BangalorevsChennai1

It is tempting to view population growth as a competition between two cities, but cities urbanise within the context of their states. While both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are among India’s more urbanised states, but it is here that Tamil Nadu leaves Karnataka far behind. Tamil Nadu is the most urbanised large state in India, with almost half its population living in cities. For context, the Indian average of urbanisation is just one third. In Karnataka, about 38 per cent of its population lives in cities and towns.

Urbanisation and the successful movement of large numbers of people out of agriculture is key to prosperity for Indians, so it pays to examine what Tamil Nadu got right.

One feature of Tamil Nadu’s success is its lack of dependence on Chennai for all its urban growth. In 1991, Chennai was about 30 per cent of urban Tamil Nadu. The state’s largest spurt of urbanisation came between 1991 and 2001, increasing by over 10 percentage points. Most of this growth came from outside Chennai, with Chennai’s share of the state’s urban population steadily declining since 1991.

BangalorevsChennai2

Much of the urban growth in Tamil Naducame from the reclassification of land and the setting up of town panchayats after the 74th amendment to the constitution was enacted. A lot of it also came from other large cities springing up. Today, Coimbatore, Madurai, Trichy and likely Tiruppur all house million+ people each.

Karnataka’s urbanisation, on the other hand, continues to be led by Bangalore. The primacy of Bangalore in the state is paramount, with Hubli-Dharwad and Mysore having a population of barely a million each. Bangalore was over 35 per cent of urban Karnataka in 2011.

Not just that, but almost half of the urban growth in Karnataka came from Bangalore’s growth between 2001 and 2011. In comparison, only about a fifth of Tamil Nadu’s urban growth came from Chennai in the same decade.

BangalorevsChennai3

This stark difference can perhaps be explained by extensive industrial growth in Tamil Nadu, which is conspicuous in its absence in its neighbouring state. From the city of Hosur giving competition to areas on the far side of the TN-Karnataka border to bustling ports trying to compete with Sri Lanka’s, Tamil Nadu has been more successful in providing an alternative to agriculture for large numbers of its people. Kerala’s urban spurt last decade appears to be similar, with habitations becoming larger and denser, as well as more people leaving agriculture as a profession. When and whether this can happen in Karnataka is an open question.

For now, Karnataka and its politics are still frequently dominated by agrarian concerns. The Western Ghats continue to pose a formidable barrier to the development of the state’s ports, with its largest port Mangalore competing with larger ports at Mumbai, Kochi and Goa. Connectivity – perhaps in the form of all-weather roads and tracks across the Western Ghats and high volume ports – may be just be the most potent driver of urbanisation in the state.

As the Karnataka government is trying to figure out how to split the Bangalore city corporation into more manageable pieces, more people should start reflecting on how to get more centres of urban growth going in the state.

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*This is the population of the entire urban agglomeration. Since the Bangalore Municipal Corporation became the Bruhat Bangalore Municipal Corporation in 2006, all urban areas around Bangalore (with the exception of small census towns and Electronic City) have been governed under one municipal authority. Chennai, on the other hand has a metropolitan corporation that is co-terminal with the Chennai district and houses a little over half of the people in the Chennai urban agglomeration. Several other city councils and town councils govern the rest of it.

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Economic growth and luxurious narratives

Faltering economic growth provides an opportunity for fresh ideas on energy policy and climate change strategy.

A couple of weeks ago I attended a seminar on ‘Low carbon growth strategies for Karnataka.’ Here is a collection of my thoughts on the topic and the discussions that took place at the seminar.

India and most of its states enjoyed 8+ per cent annual economic growth for the better part of the last decade. This growth was quite prolific and for many non-economist observers, it appeared to be chugging along on its own steam. A whole host of narratives sprung up from different corners on how sacrificing on a few percentage points on economic growth could help promote their cause and lead to better outcomes overall for India. In the process, there was a certain instrumental maligning of economic growth that was not always evidence-based.

The UPA government’s narrative of inclusive growth is perhaps the dominant narrative of the time – essentially saying that many Indians were not able to enjoy the fruits of economic growth and this required a rights-based, redistribution-led approach to make it ostensibly more inclusive. Other narratives in the environmental space include ‘(ecologically) sustainable growth’, low-carbon growth and many more, which while acknowledging that growth was necessary, wanted the growth to have a far lower ecological cost or much lower carbon emissions, even if it sacrificed several percentage points.

With annual economic growth lower than 5 per cent today, many of these narratives feel anachronistic. These “growth-modifier” narratives were only possible because the Indian economy was enjoying a high growth rate. Apart from creating fiscal space in the short run for entitlement and subsidy programmes, high growth also created the narrative space that could house such ideas. This space has rapidly vanished over the last two years but various organisations and campaigns have failed to adapt to changing circumstances. Low-carbon economic growth is one such.

A low-carbon growth strategy for Karnataka appears superfluous for a second reason. It is far from clear whether Karnataka has a growth strategy at all. As The Transition State previously showed, Karnataka has grown more slowly and alleviated less poverty both compared to the national mean and to other higher income states in India. The new government in Karnataka that was formed in 2013 has failed to articulate an economic policy or bring about any large reforms thus far. Advocating for low-carbon growth strategies in the absence of a basic growth strategy seems out of place.

Poverty and Growth - Higher Income States

There is also a false equivalence between low-carbon growth and renewable energy-led growth. Low-carbon growth essentially focuses on climate mitigation and ignores adaptation (this blog would advocate for exactly the opposite,) calling for sectors like energy, transport and agriculture to adopt policies that reduce emissions. Ignoring international climate negotiations and India’s position for the moment, these low emission options are further constrained by misconceptions.

Nuclear energy and LNG are two prominent energy options that are both low-carbon but non-renewable. LNG produces less than 40 per cent of the emissions that coal does per unit of electricity generated and will likely be the leading reason for the United States reducing its carbon emissions over the next decade and more. On the other hand, nations like Germany which are trying to phase out nuclear power have already increased carbon emissions as a part of its Energiewende strategy, instead of decreasing them. The larger battle for climate change cannot be won by taking nuclear energy off the table, even if it is politically correct to do so. Evidence be damned.

Finally, most narratives on energy debates ignore the Indian context. High income countries are mostly those whose energy demands have plateaued, and thus “either-or” questions on energy options are justified. Coal or LNG, nuclear or renewables, wind or tidal, and more. All have associated trade-offs, and nations can choose based on domestic considerations and global pressures.

India’s energy demands are growing as the economy grows, and millions of Indians still do not have access to adequate electricity for domestic use. With an energy elasticity of growth at 0.9-1, it means that a doubling of India’s GDP will require us to nearly double power generation capacity. This is inescapable. So instead of an “either-or” debate, we must ask how we can increase power generation from all sources. How public policies can be designed such that it is easier to do business in the energy sector is an important question. It takes years to set up and operationalise all types of power plants, with bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles lengthening the process significantly. This along with growing political risk have to be managed far better.

Proponents of renewable energy also have a chance to shift from advocating for subsidies to make renewable energy work, and instead think of what policy changes can make it easier to deploy wind turbines, solar farms and more. Faltering economic growth is providing an opportunity for fresh ideas on energy policy and climate change strategy. And the cost of squandering them will be very high.

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Toilets and access

The National Sample Survey Office released new findings this week from the 69th round of the National Sample Survey conducted in 2012, providing the latest state-level data on sanitation, water supply and electricity access.

The last set of reliable numbers on rural sanitation came from the 2011 census, where we found that about 30.7 percent of rural Indian households had their own toilets in 2010. As covered by The Transition State, this had improved in the previous decade by about 9 percentage points.

Broadly consistent with that rate of increase, the NSS round from 2012 reports that 31.9 percent of rural households had their own toilets in 2012, an increase of ~1.2 percent in two years. What the NSS press release dwells on at greater length is the number of rural households with access to toilets, which is a significantly greater number in most Indian states.

This access is self-reported by surveyed households and can mean that they share or use a neighbour’s toilet, have access to a community/public toilet or perhaps have access at their workplace, especially if they live close to towns and cities. However, the access data is likely an overestimate as there is nothing to prove that every member of the household avails the use of toilets, or uses them all the time.

Nationally, 40.6 percent rural households have access to toilets, as opposed to about 31.9 percent of them owning or having exclusive access to toilets. Since there is a two year lag between the two data points collected (as shown below for all states) this gap can be treated as a minor overestimate.

Toilets vs Access2

As one can see, there is a phenomenal range of differences between households owning toilets and households having access to them. A state like Karnataka has almost no difference, implying that toilets are treated as private, household goods in the southern state. Meghalaya is the other extreme, where the number of households with access to toilets is almost double the number of households who own them. If only access were to be measured, states like Nagaland, Delhi, Sikkim, Mizoram and others could declare themselves to be free of open defecation today.

The chart below illustrates the difference between the ranking of states on rural sanitation between the two measures.

Toilets vs Access

As one can see, most of the change happens in states with higher toilet ownership. Delhi, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are the biggest gainers when access is considered, with Kerala, Manipur, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh losing the most ground.

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Politics begins at home

We spend a lot of time talking about national politics in India, with the general elections in 2014 being a subject of conversations for well over a year now. Conversations on state level politics take up the remainder of our time. In contrast, many of the problems that we face on a day to day basis are municipal in nature: be it the lack of good roads and public transport, unreliable power supply, unsafe drinking water or garbage that lines our streets.

Who becomes your next corporator or local council member is perhaps as important as who becomes the next prime minister of India, but a curious inversion of interests means that we care a lot more about the latter than the former. When municipal elections took place in Karnataka earlier this year, much of the analysis and debate was about what the results meant for the soon-to-come state assembly elections. Who became corporators, won control of municipal councils and what they planned to do for their towns and cities remained a distant afterthought in most of our minds.

Cities are also complex systems that require sophistication and professional input. To improve Bangalore’s roads, for example, needs our elected representatives to ensure multiple things. The roads need a high quality of construction and functioning drains that clear the roads of stagnant water. The roads also need a well-planned traffic network accompanied by a good backbone of public transport. We also need better systems of coordination for what roads get dug up and when, along with a schedule of work that is sensitive to the monsoon.  All this cannot happen without trained and motivated elected representatives, who manage existing public employees like engineers, planners and administrators.

The popular understanding that our cities are poor is also quite mistaken. Indian cities are rich in assets and in vibrancy, and this is evident in how Bangalore and others have grown rapidly in the last decade. It is due to mismanagement and neglect that we are unable to extract value from municipal assets. This mismanagement makes it difficult to finance urban infrastructure and public services, and again requires well-trained leadership to reverse the trend.

Bangalore has woken up to the reality that things cannot continue the way they have been, so far. Agitations from the past few years have proved that. While performance of elected representatives has been underwhelming, there is a dawning realization that the supply of good politics does not grow on trees. In a democracy, people are governed no better than they deserve. We need better political engagement by citizens to change this – with more people voting, more good people entering politics and by financial contributions in the support of good candidates. If we want ‘black money’ to leave politics, it is time that some honest, well-earned money enters to replace it.

India being a young country also provides an incredible opportunity where a large number of youth will be coming of voting age in the next few years. How well they engage with city politics and governance can determine the future of Bangalore and other cities.

Beyond corruption and vested interests, urban governance needs the management of multiple stakeholders with interests that are often at odds with each other. The ability to persuade a diverse set of people for the betterment of a neighbourhood, a ward or a city is in short supply. Managing a city also needs astute application of economic reasoning, where an unpriced good like free parking or free water can turn out to be enormously expensive, all things considered.

Big cities like New York or London have famous mayors who have the ability to transform their cities. There is no reason why Bangalore’s leaders cannot reach a similar position in the next 10 years.

Disclosure: I am a part of the Takshashila Institution’s team that is developing the curriculum for Bangalore Political Action Committee (B.PAC)’s Civic Leadership Incubation Programme (B.CLIP), a non-partisan initiative that seeks to train professionals and aspiring civic leaders to enter city governance and politics.

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Infographic – Growth and Poverty in India

A lot of heat was generated in the Sen vs. Bhagwati debate that took place a few months ago, along with some rays of light. The same followed after the release of the latest poverty numbers. Here’s a look at how Indian states have fared in both economic growth and poverty reduction between 2004-05 and 2011-12.

Poverty and Growth in India - A Story in Five Charts

Gross Domestic Products are the most common estimates of economic growth. GDPs of Indian states (called “GSDP”) matter, but bigger states obviously have larger GDPs. To compare states, one needs to look at GDP per person (“per capita” for those who like to use Latin). It should be noted that GDP per person is different from the average or median income.

In the 2000s, states raced against each other on per capita GDP. While almost all states grew well, not all of them could keep pace with others close to them. The chart below shows you how state rankings have changed between 2004-05 and 2011-12.

GSDP Slopes

Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, the biggest relative gains were made by Sikkim and Uttarakhand, with Punjab, Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Karnataka losing significant ground.

If the same chart is made for how states have fared on poverty reduction, a different picture emerges. States have been ordered below based on the percentage of population in the state that lives below the poverty line.

Poverty ratio Slopes

There appears to be a lot more dynamism in poverty reduction, perhaps because there are several states that are much closer to each other. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, the biggest relative gains in poverty reduction relative to each other were made by the states of Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa. While no state’s poverty headcount increased in this time period, the relative underperformers were Assam, Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand and Karnataka.

Note that the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Puducherry and Tripura were removed from this list as their 2004-05 poverty numbers were based on poverty lines of other states (like Assam and Maharashtra) and hence the numbers are not comparable to the 2011-12 numbers. Some news stories and opinion pieces had erroneously talked about how several northeastern states had worsened in poverty. Such observations are sadly mistaken.

The two charts from earlier tell us only about relative performance of states – using their closest competitors as benchmarks. However, absolute performance on growth and poverty reduction matter just as much, if not more. The next few graphs examine just that: examining the growth in GSDP per person, and reduction on poverty in percentage points between the years 2004-05 and 2011-12.

Poverty and Growth - States

The above graph shows a clear correlation between economic growth and poverty reduction.Higher the growth, higher is the poverty reduction observed. The only major outlier to this is the National Capital Territory of Delhi – which is so because Delhi started with a low poverty rate of 13.1 percent in 2004-05. The graph also clearly shows that the high poverty reduction, high growth state of Uttarakhand is far removed from all the other states.

On Uttarakhand, many are quick to jump to the conclusion that this high “reckless” growth caused the disaster earlier this year. What we can conclude from data is that Uttarakhand grew exceptionally well in the past decade and reduced poverty equally rapidly, but failed to reduce any vulnerability it had to natural disasters. Had an event like the Kedarnath disaster happened a decade ago, there would be a lot fewer residents, tourists and property to be affected as greatly.

The next two graphs look at comparable groups of states: large, higher income states and lower income states of India.

Poverty and Growth - Higher Income States

When both growth and poverty reduction are looked at in concert, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh come off as the best perfomers, well above the national average on both parameters. It is also noteworthy that while Gujarat grew faster than Maharashtra in terms of its GSDP during the 7 year period under consideration, Maharashtra did slightly better on a per person basis.

Following on the previous charts, Punjab and Karnataka’s poor performance comes as no surprise. Karnataka grew quickly in the early 2000s with the IT boom, and hasn’t quite been the same since. Punjab’s agrarian prosperity also seems to have peaked, with insufficient dynamism in services or manufacturing sectors to sustain high growth.

Poverty and Growth in India - Lower Income States

Odisha had the highest rate of poverty reduction in India of all states, and is among the top performers alongside Bihar, Rajasthan and MP among the lower income states. Chattisgarh grew well, but failed to reduce poverty as much as the other lower income states, and Jharkhand did poorly on both fronts.

Economic growth is clearly necessary but not sufficient for poverty reduction. Our conversations on economic growth have to evolve from “Growth or Something else” to “Growth AND Something More“. What can be observed over each of the last three charts is the absence of states on the “Low Growth, High Poverty Reduction” quadrant. Evidently, there are many states who grew well, but failed to provide sufficient public goods for significant poverty reduction. However there are no states that managed to reduce poverty to a great extent without strong economic growth during the mid 2000s. What has been well known in economist circles is confirmed again for Indian states.

Between 2004-05 and 2011-12, the Indian economy grew at an average rate of about 8.5 percent (CAGR, Compound Annual Growth Rate), and thus at 6.7 percent per person. Indian states were spread around this number. In 2013 the growth rates have fallen to about 5 percent nationally – and there are no signs of going back to an 8 percent growth rate in the near future. It is not difficult to imagine how abysmal poverty reduction will be over the next few years. We may end up failing another generation of India’s poor.

Postscript. There are some caveats to keep in mind, while interpreting the performance of individual states. First, while poverty reduction and growth are compared across the same time period, there can be a lag between the two. New wealth generated can take time to percolate through the economy. Second, GSDP numbers are generated by state economics and statistics departments based on central guidelines. The competence and independence of different states’ economics departments can vary a lot, and it is possible that GSDP numbers from some states could be overestimated.

Third, there are many discrepancies between poverty ratio numbers calculated from NSS surveys from  2009-10 and 2011-12. States such as Bihar show little poverty reduction between 2004-05 and 2009-10, but phenomenal decrease in the next two years. While 2009-10 was a drought year and might have underestimated the overall reduction in poverty, the planning commission needs analyse and provide clarifications on the latest state-level poverty numbers presented. However, these caveats do not affect the overall observation that there are no Indian states that grew poorly but reduced poverty greatly.

Many thanks to Dr. Mukul Asher for discussions that helped shape this piece.

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Census Towns and Toilets

The Transition State returns to examining sanitation data today and we take a look at toilets in the odd entities called ‘Census Towns’. (For previous analyses see this and this.)

Census towns are formed by villages that show an increasingly urban character in terms of density, size and economy. They are considered towns only by the Census and not by state governments and are hence called ‘Census towns’ as opposed to ‘statutory towns’. Census towns are governed locally by village panchayats.

Why are census towns relevant from a sanitation perspective? Rural sanitation in India is still stuck at a level where a majority of people continue to defecate in the open, and less than 1 in 3 households have a toilet. Understanding what drives people to build and use toilets is necessary to change this. Urban India fares much better in toilet ownership – but fails quite spectacularly in other aspects of sanitation like waste collection and disposal.

Census towns are of interest here because they are places which have *just* urbanised, and are still at the margin. Census towns get called so when they have crossed all three of the following thresholds: a population density of 500 people per square kilometre, village size of 5,000 residents and 75 percent of the working age male population employed in non-agricultural sectors.

So how do census towns fare in toilet ownership compared to their rural surroundings? I compare census towns with the rural taluk (sub-district) in terms of toilet ownership for the state of Karnataka. The taluks are ordered in an ascending order of toilet ownership.

Toilets-Census-Towns-Karnataka

Census towns in Karnataka appear to have much higher toilet ownership than their rural surroundings. And when the rural base goes higher than 20 percent, most of the census towns cross the 80 percent mark in toilet ownership.

Several things change between census towns and other villages. The services sector would have taken off in census towns, likely also resulting in higher incomes. But the most important change is that of population density. This increase in density results in a reduction in open spaces where people can defecate conveniently. If people have to go more than say 200 yards every time they need to relieve themselves, then the case for a toilet becomes a lot stronger. The ‘call of nature’ becomes more difficult as nature is beating a retreat out of the census town.

Urbanisation seems solve the toilet ownership problem. But toilets are far from sufficient in a city to achieve the public good that is sanitation. Waste collection and treatment become vital – be it through a sewerage network, local treatment plants, septage management or some other means.

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The Centralisation of Public Expenditure

The Ministry of Finance released the Indian Public Finance Statistics 2012-13 earlier today on their website. Drafted by a team under the direction of the Chief Economic Advisor to the Finmin (currently the RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan), the statistics are of very high value as they are a collation of union and state government expenditures and revenues from the past several years.

When we hear the union budget every March, we get only a partial picture of what is planned for India in the coming year, as states play a significant role in allocating public resources.

Today I take a quick look at the decentralisation of public expenditure in India, between the union government and the states. Local bodies are outside the purview of the current analysis. Below is a graph of share of union and states in the total public expenditure in India.

Public Expenditure Centre and States

A few things stand out. The union government used to be a massive 65 percent of the overall government expenditure in 1990-91, which was continuously declining for the subsequent decade, until 2003-04. This is good evidence of financial decentralisation. However, the union government share started increasing from 2004-05 onwards, around the time the first UPA government came into power. The latest two years’ numbers are tentative as they refer to budget and revised estimates rather than actual expenditure, therefore we can say that union share has shot up to around 55% of the total in the recent past.

Below is a second graph, this time on the union-state shares of the total development expenditure over the past two decades. Development expenditure refers to expenses on infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, power and more; and leaves out defence, police, administration, interest repayments and several other items.

Development Expenditure - Centre and State

On the whole, union government expenditures are lower here because a few big-ticket, union-only expenses don’t get counted: defence and interest payments being the largest of them. The trends here are a little different.

While the union government share reduced from about 47 percent in 1990-91 to about 37 percent in 1996-97, it started steadily increasing from then to about 2006-07. It has spiked up even more since then, and it is notable that union government share was highest in the last 23 years in 2008-09 at 49.7 percent. This is strong evidence that fiscal decentralisation as a national policy is dead in the water.

Many commentators have noted the relentless centralisation of financial flows in the past few years, with ‘centrally sponsored schemes’ becoming bigger and more numerous by the year. The components that have contributed to this union government expenditure need to be unpacked further to understand what exactly is happening.

Government for 1.2 billion people needs as much flexibility and adaptability as one can give, and this dangerous re-centralisation of public expenditure needs to be reversed.

Notes.

  1. Data collated from Indian Public Finance Statistics Reports 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2012-13.
  2. Data is unavailable for the years 1991-92 to 1994-95.
  3. 2012-13 numbers are budget estimates and 2011-12 numbers are revised budget estimates, so they must be interpreted with care. The rest are actual expenditures.
  4. The y-axes were cropped in the graph to better illustrate the changing trends in the union/state expenditure share.
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In Search of a New Village

The south Indian state of Karnataka has over 29,000 villages spread across a 190,000 square kilometres. Anyone who travels a little in the state quickly realises that there are common village names that keep recurring. Using the Census 2011 village directory for the state, here’s a comprehensive look at the most common village names in Karnataka.

It turns out that the most common village name in Karnataka is Hosahalli – or simply, ‘New Village’. Hosahalli is the complete name of about 108 villages, and forms a part of the name for another 82 (For example, Chikkahosahalli, which means ‘small new village’). Curiously enough, the second most village name is Hosur, which is a variant of the former and also means ‘New Village’. A possible reason as to why this has come about is that as villages grew in size, people might have shifted to an adjacent site and created a new settlement, perhaps a couple of miles from the original village. In conversation, this new settlement would be referred to as just that – new village or new place –  until one day the name got formalised in an inscription or an agreement, and the name Hosahalli or Hosur became permanent.

Other common village names include Bommanahalli, Gollahalli (village of cowherds), Kurubarahalli (village of shepherds), Siddapura and Basavanahalli (dedicated to the reformer Basavanna).

Most Common Village Names in Karnataka

Different words are used to denote a village or settlement as well – from hallis to puras to nagaras. Of these, halli and ooru are of a Dravidian origin, with halli being equivalent of palli in Tamil, while most of the others are borrowed or adapted from Sanskrit. Pura is said to denote a walled town and nagara a town or a city, but they were often used quite interchangeably while naming villages and towns, even historically. Villages are also named after local features like lakes (kere, sandra) and fortresses (kote), as well as after gods and goddesses.

Most Common types and Parts of Village Names in Karnataka

So there you have it. If you are thinking of starting a new settlement in Karnataka, you couldn’t go wrong by calling it the unimaginative, but eminently serviceable Hosahalli or Hosuru. I’ll take them over the Residencies, Enclaves and Gardens that have come up in Bangalore, any day.

Many thanks to Shreevatsa and Mohan KV for an erudite discussion on the meaning of village names, their origins and their use. Kudos to Karthik for suggesting the perfect name for the post.

Addendum. This post drew a flurry of fascinating conversations on twitter and elsewhere today. On popular demand, below is a more complete (and revised!) list of suffixes in village names in Karnataka. You can also download the raw data used in this post from here.

Most Common suffixes and prefixes of Village Names in Karnataka

 

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Bangalore refuses to turn up and vote

[This post used data from the website of the Chief Electoral Officer of Karnataka, which was subsequently revised the next day. As per the revised numbers, Bangalore urban showed a turnout of 57.4%, a full 7.5 percentage points greater than the 2008 assembly elections. This improvement cannot be disregarded as trivial, thus the argument made by the original post is no longer valid.]

In the face of high expectations, the residents of Bangalore yet again failed to turn up and vote in large numbers in yesterday’s assembly elections. With 52.8% of the Bangalore Urban district’s voters casting their vote yesterday, it was only a marginal improvement over 2008 – when 46.9% of the district’s voters had turned up. This is but a marginal increase of 5.9 percentage points, which can perhaps be explained away to a great extent by the simple fact that the elections took place on a Sunday.

Voter Turnout 2013 Karnataka Assembly Elections

The capital city’s voter turnout was well below the state average of 70.2 percent. Curiously, the maximum turnout was seen in the adjoining Bangalore Rural district – at 77.95 percent. The only other districts with their polling numbers in 50s and early 60s percentages were Bidar, Gulbarga, Yadgir, Bijapur and Raichur – something that could be because of the high summer temperatures there.

The map was created using Gramener’s excellent map tool. Polling data was obtained from the Karnataka Election Commission website courtesy of Citizen Matters.

Update. As my fellow blogger Karthik pointed out, the previous assembly elections in Bangalore took place on a Saturday. Therefore, the weekend explanation for a greater turnout could be invalid. Also – while Bangalore as a whole shows a low turnout, it is certainly possible that individual constituencies showed much higher turnouts. It will be interesting to watch the numbers for constituencies with candidates endorsed by BPAC and those with strong Loksatta campaigns and see how well they fared.

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Toilets in Rural Karnataka – A peer effect?

In my previous post, I had taken a look at how sanitation improved in rural Karnataka and India over the decade of 2001 to 2011. Three broad categories of districts had emerged in Karnataka, and a relationship was visible between a district’s starting position on toilet ownership and how well it improved.

Going by the spirit that drove the previous analysis, I go a level deeper and more granular, and take a look at Karnataka’s taluks (or sub-district units) to see how things are changing in rural sanitation.

Karnataka Rural Sanitation - Improvement in Districts and Taluks

The above graph tries to see just that: where taluks and districts were in 2001, and how much they improved over 2001-2011. It is immediately apparent that taluks follow the districts of Karnataka in their behaviour: there again appears to be a strong link between where a taluk is starting from in terms of toilet ownership, and how much it has improved in the past 10 years.

If we simplify the first graphic by removing the district data points,  the positions of all 176 taluks of Karnataka are more clearly visible.

Karnataka Rural Sanitation - Sanitation Trap

What one can see is that when the starting point of a taluk is below 15% toilet ownership, the improvements are never phenomenal. When the starting point crosses about 20%, many more high performers become visible. It is possible that taluks and districts have to get out of a “poor sanitation trap” before being able to improve significantly.

Complementing the trend, every district that started with 40% toilet ownership or higher, improved by at least 20 percentage points, underscoring the relationship between the two. While the trends are easy enough to visualise and comprehend, the reasons for them may be complex and difficult to be certain of.

One reason for this link between starting position and improvement in sanitation could be the peer effect. The peer effect is where someone’s behaviour is influenced by those around them. It has been well studied in the field of education, where it’s been found that a student’s educational outcome is strongly linked to his or her peer group and the group of friends. ‘Peer pressure’  is a form of this as well, although mostly with negative connotations, where people pick up habits and mannerisms from their peers.

Coming to toilets in Karnataka, imagine the 15-20% mark: it’s where 1 in 6 or 1 in 5 houses have a toilet. At those numbers, most people have a neighbour who owns a toilet and uses it. People who are still defecating in the open can not only imagine, but also see what the benefits and comforts of owning a toilet can do. Possibly, even the transition to using toilets (and cleaning them!) can become easier as people can learn from each other. Toilets also possibly become aspirational objects – in effect nudging more households to avail what subsidies come their way.

An alternate reason could be a lot more mundane: the link could simply be a result of the Nirmal Gram Puraskar award and the programmatic design of the government’s total sanitation campaign. A large focus of the campaign was to take villages that were doing reasonably well on sanitation – and push them to near-complete toilet ownership, making them “Open Defecation Free” (at least in theory). Here, individual toilet subsidies were coupled with a cash award to villages (and their panchayats) which managed to go open-defecation-free. While it is possible for the NGP to have had an effect on the correlation, it is unlikely that it can explain it entirely.

One way to decide between the two (and other!) possible reasons for the pattern of rural sanitation improvement is to go deeper once more look at it at the habitation level – at villages and hamlets and how they improved. Unfortunately, this isn’t possible with Census data. Either way, these results have a significant bearing on how we can improve rural sanitation in the coming decade, where we have to achieve a high, sustained improvement in sanitation but with reasonable public investment.

Data used in this post are available here: Karnataka Districts | Karnataka Taluks.

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